UN Gaza Report: Justice Muralidhar on Evidence of Child Killings

Your report concludes that Palestinian children were deliberately targeted rather than merely becoming collateral victims of war. What was the decisive evidence that convinced the commission?

I would hesitate to identify any single piece of evidence as decisive. It was the cumulative weight of several independent and credible sources that persuaded us.

The evidence reveals two distinct methods through which children have been killed and injured.

The first is the repeated use of high-yield bombs and heavy munitions over densely populated civilian neighbourhoods. After October 7, 2023, this pattern intensified dramatically.

The second method is, in many ways, even more disturbing. It involves the combined use of quadcopters, drones, and snipers. These quadcopters are equipped with thermal imaging cameras capable of distinguishing the size of human bodies. Operators are therefore able to identify whether the person in their sights is likely to be a child or an adult.

We found testimony from Israeli soldiers themselves describing these operations. Some spoke openly to television crews about how operating drones had become “like a game”. They described competitions among soldiers over who could eliminate more targets.

One testimony quoted in our report comes from an ITV documentary titled Breaking Ranks: Inside Israel’s War. One Israeli soldier says:

“The drones, in my opinion, are what most dehumanise the other side. You see everything on the screen, and you drop the bomb. It feels like a game. You can sit safely in a basement, helmet off, half-dressed, and kill Palestinians.”

Your report also relies on material posted online by Israeli soldiers themselves. How significant was that evidence?

Despite refusing to cooperate with our commission, Israeli soldiers have placed substantial incriminating material in the public domain.

One example concerns a soldier from the Israeli Army’s 252nd Division. He openly admitted to a reporter from Haaretz that he shot and killed an unarmed 16-year-old Palestinian boy.

These are not allegations made by third parties.

Israel has circulated an 18-page rebuttal accusing your commission of bias. How do you respond?

Interestingly, the rebuttal does not challenge many of the specific pieces of incriminating evidence supplied by Israeli soldiers themselves. Those remain largely unanswered.

Instead, Israel argues that our commission ignored the violence committed by Hamas.

Israel did not send the rebuttal to us. They circulated it in the public domain.

On June 15, our commission submitted another report to the Human Rights Council examining the conduct of non-state actors, including Palestinian armed groups in Gaza and violent settlers in the West Bank.

That report explicitly documents abuses committed by Palestinian armed groups, including against Palestinian civilians and children.

Because those findings had already been comprehensively documented, we did not repeat them at length in the present report on children.

Our reports should be read as a continuum rather than as isolated documents.

We are open to being corrected. If anyone believes we have got the evidence wrong, they should engage with us and produce contrary evidence.

Israel refused to cooperate with the commission. Without access to Israeli military records or official testimony, how did you satisfy yourself, as a judge, that your findings would withstand legal scrutiny?

Our methodology is extremely rigorous.

Every investigation begins with a public call for submissions. We invite governments, organisations, victims, witnesses, and experts to provide material relevant to the subject under investigation.

For this report, we consulted multiple independent sources. We collected thousands of open-source items, all of which underwent extensive verification.

Where possible, we interviewed victims and witnesses directly.

Children evacuated abroad for medical treatment were interviewed in accordance with strict international child-protection protocols.

We also interviewed doctors, nurses, healthcare workers, journalists, lawyers, and academics who had direct contact with victims and their families.

We examined hospital records, pathology reports, X-rays, photographs, and videos.

Electronic evidence underwent particularly rigorous scrutiny.

Our investigators employed geolocation analysis, chronolocation, metadata extraction, visual authentication, and facial recognition techniques wherever appropriate.

Importantly, we never rely upon a witness statement alone.

We probed whether the child was actually present at that location. Can satellite imagery verify the scene? Was an Israeli military unit operating there at that time?

Every piece of evidence is cross-verified against multiple independent sources.

What legal standard does the commission apply before reaching its conclusions?

We are an investigative body, not a criminal court.

Our responsibility is to determine whether there are reasonable grounds for reaching particular conclusions based on credible and corroborated evidence.

In that sense, our role resembles the investigative stage preceding criminal prosecution.

If I may use a domestic analogy, it is similar to a police investigation culminating in a charge sheet. The judicial process follows later.

Courts such as the International Court of Justice or the International Criminal Court remain free to accept, reject, or supplement our findings.

Indeed, our evidence has already been requested by international judicial bodies.

South Africa, which has instituted proceedings before the International Court of Justice, requested access to our material, and we have shared relevant evidence.

Likewise, the International Criminal Court has requested our evidence, and we have cooperated fully.

From a judicial standpoint, I am entirely satisfied that the evidence provides reasonable grounds for concluding that Palestinian children were deliberately targeted for killing, maiming, and the destruction of their childhood.

Your report identifies repeated patterns of sniper fire, drone attacks, and quadcopter strikes aimed at children’s heads and upper bodies. Does this point to individual rogue soldiers, or does it suggest command responsibility and institutional policy?

The evidence we examined goes well beyond isolated misconduct by individual soldiers.

We found evidence indicating that the conduct extended beyond individual actors and reached the level of military units and command structures.

For example, the report cites testimony relating to a soldier from the 252nd Division who acknowledged killing a boy and being congratulated by his battalion commander afterwards.

That is significant because it suggests approval rather than punishment.

We also cite a sniper from the Nahal Brigade, whose testimony appeared in Haaretz. He described initially hesitating before shooting a child. According to his account, his commander instructed him not to concern himself with the child’s age and told him to proceed with the shooting.

These testimonies reveal something about the operational environment in which soldiers were functioning.

We have identified specific battalions, brigades, and divisions connected with documented incidents. We have been able to trace responsibility with considerable precision.

We have identified military formations, units, and, in many cases, the particular incidents in which they were involved.

Does that mean the commission believes there is sufficient material for criminal investigations into individual commanders and military personnel?

Yes. International law recognises the principle of universal jurisdiction.

Certain crimes are considered so serious that national courts may prosecute them regardless of where they occurred or the nationality of either the victims or perpetrators.

Take India, for example. India is a State Party to several international human rights treaties, including the Convention on the Rights of the Child.

If an individual accused of grave violations against children were found within Indian jurisdiction, Indian authorities would have legal obligations under international law to investigate the matter.

The same principle applies to many other countries.

You also referred to dual nationals serving in the Israeli military. Why is that legally significant?

It is significant because accountability is not confined to one jurisdiction.

There is publicly available information showing that tens of thousands of dual nationals have served, or are serving, in the Israeli military. According to official Israeli military data published in March 2025, there were more than 12,000 United States citizens, around 6,000 French nationals, and approximately 5,000 Russian nationals among more than 50,000 soldiers holding foreign citizenship alongside Israeli nationality.

If individuals serving in military units implicated in serious violations are identified and later return to their countries of nationality, those states cannot simply ignore the allegations.

Our report identifies, down to specific battalions, brigades, and divisions, military units allegedly involved in attacks on Palestinian children. If any member of those units is found within the jurisdiction of another state, that country may exercise universal jurisdiction and investigate whether criminal liability arises.

Your report repeatedly links attacks on children to the destruction of Palestinian society itself. Why is harm to children legally significant beyond the immediate loss of life?

When children are systematically killed, permanently disabled, denied education, deprived of healthcare, traumatised, and displaced, the consequences extend far beyond the immediate victims.

Between October 7, 2023, and October 7, 2025, at least 20,179 Palestinian children were killed across Gaza, the West Bank, and East Jerusalem. Tens of thousands more were injured.

Doctors described children arriving with single gunshot wounds to the skull or neck—injuries indicating precision targeting rather than indiscriminate fire.

We also documented the extensive destruction of schools, universities, and healthcare facilities.

Approximately 97 per cent of schools in Gaza have been damaged or destroyed.

Medical workers coined the term Wounded Child, No Surviving Family (WCNSF) in Gaza. That alone illustrates the scale of devastation.

Your report also documents attacks on hospitals, ambulances, and humanitarian relief. Why are these particularly serious under international law?

International humanitarian law provides very clear protections for medical facilities, ambulances, and humanitarian personnel.

Yet we documented repeated attacks on hospitals, healthcare workers, and ambulances.

Children holding white flags were reportedly shot. Ambulances attempting to rescue wounded civilians were targeted.

Children requiring emergency treatment accumulated at the Rafah crossing while awaiting permission to leave Gaza.

Many died before permission was granted.

The report also states that adolescent Palestinian boys are frequently labelled as terrorists. Why is that legally important?

Because legal classifications have life-and-death consequences.

The report documents instances in which Palestinian boys—some as young as 10 or 12—were treated as legitimate military targets after being labelled terrorists.

When labels become substitutes for legal assessment, they create conditions in which unlawful killings become normalised.

That is one of the patterns that concerned the Commission.

Your report argues that international law has been violated on multiple fronts. Which legal frameworks are most relevant to the Commission’s findings?

The violations we have documented engage several branches of international law simultaneously.

First, there is international human rights law, reflected in instruments such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Convention on the Rights of the Child.

Second, there is international humanitarian law, particularly the Geneva Conventions, which regulate the conduct of parties during armed conflict.

Third, there is international criminal law, especially the Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal Court.

Our report concludes that the conduct we investigated raises serious questions under all three bodies of law.

The post-Second World War international legal order was built on the understanding that even wars have rules. Those rules exist to protect civilians, especially the most vulnerable.

Today, we are witnessing repeated violations of those protections.

As the occupying power, what additional legal obligations does Israel have towards Palestinian children?

Occupation creates additional responsibilities. International law imposes positive obligations on an occupying power to protect civilians living under its control.

When an occupying power exercises effective control over territory, it cannot simply disclaim responsibility for conditions on the ground.

Some argue that Palestinian adolescents involved in disturbances or armed activity lose their civilian protections. How does the Commission view that issue?

International law is very clear. Children remain children.

Our concern arises because we documented a pattern in which adolescent Palestinian boys—sometimes as young as 10—were labelled terrorists.

Once labelled that way, they appeared to become legitimate targets in the eyes of some military personnel.

That is incompatible with the special protections international law affords children.

What obligations do countries such as India have after a United Nations Commission reaches findings of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity? Can neutrality still be maintained?

Every state has obligations under international law.

Those obligations arise not because our Commission has reached particular conclusions but because states themselves have accepted treaties establishing duties to prevent and punish grave international crimes.

Countries often describe themselves as neutral. Neutrality may be a political position. It cannot become an excuse for ignoring legal obligations.

India, like many other countries, is party to several important international conventions. Its commitments carry responsibilities.

This is ultimately about protecting universal legal principles rather than choosing political sides.

If international courts act upon your report, where should accountability begin? Political leaders? Military commanders? Soldiers? Arms suppliers?

I do not think there is a rigid hierarchy. The essential question is whether credible evidence exists against particular individuals.

If evidence identifies soldiers, they should be investigated. If evidence establishes command responsibility, commanders should be investigated.

If political leaders bear responsibility, they too should be investigated.

The process should follow the evidence rather than predetermined categories.

You have also expressed concern about political pressure on international judicial institutions. Why?

Because accountability depends upon independent courts. If judges or prosecutors become subject to sanctions or political intimidation, their ability to function independently is compromised.

Sanctions imposed by governments against judges of the International Criminal Court inevitably raise concerns about judicial independence.

International justice cannot function effectively unless states allow institutions to discharge their mandates without political interference.

Everything should not be reduced to geopolitical competition.

You presented the report before the UN Security Council. What message did you convey to member states?

Yes, I presented the report and made a presentation before the Security Council.

I told them that for many months we have heard statements expressing anguish, outrage, and condemnation.

Those statements are important, but they do not save children. We urged Member States to define a minimum humanitarian bottom line.

For example, no child anywhere in the world should die because medical evacuation has been denied.

If the international community cannot agree even on that principle, then we have failed the most basic standards of humanity.

Today’s Palestinian child cannot be made to pay for historical tragedies or political disputes stretching back generations.

That was the central message we conveyed to the Security Council.

The international community must now demonstrate that international law is capable of producing consequences.

Otherwise, the credibility of the entire international legal system will suffer.

The Commission also briefed different regional groups in Geneva. What was the response?

Before presenting the report publicly, we met representatives of several regional organisations.

We briefed ambassadors from the European Union. We also met representatives of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation. There were discussions with other diplomatic groups as well. The response was broadly supportive.

Countries expressed appreciation for the Commission’s work and acknowledged the seriousness of the findings.

Is the United Nations itself facing a credibility test over Gaza?

Very much so. People are no longer asking whether violations have occurred. They want to know whether the international system is capable of responding.

I conveyed precisely that concern to members of the Security Council.

History will judge the United Nations not simply by the reports it produced but by whether it acted when confronted with overwhelming evidence of children’s suffering.

You have spoken about the obligations of other states. Are there also obligations on the Palestinian Authority?

Certainly. The Palestinian Authority also has responsibilities under international law.

No public authority is exempt from scrutiny.

Our next report, which will be presented to the General Assembly later this year, examines the conduct of state institutions, including both the Government of Israel and the Palestinian Authority.

We shall critically assess not only what the Palestinian Authority has done but also where it has failed to discharge its responsibilities, particularly in the West Bank and East Jerusalem.

That examination will be conducted with the same standards of independence that we apply to every subject before the Commission.

At the same time, you have noted that the Palestinian Authority’s capacity has been severely weakened.

Yes.

One must distinguish between legal responsibility and practical capacity. The Palestinian Authority is expected to perform governmental functions. However, on the ground, its ability to do so has been severely constrained. Palestinian police personnel have themselves been targeted.

Israel’s continuing control over large parts of the occupied territory significantly limits the Authority’s ability to exercise normal governmental powers.

That does not eliminate its obligations. But it is an important factual consideration when assessing what it has realistically been able to do.

What is your assessment of the proposed “Board of Peace” that is expected to oversee Gaza’s future governance?

The proposal raises several fundamental concerns.

The initiative originated with US President Donald Trump’s Gaza peace plan and later received Security Council endorsement.

However, the proposed governance mechanism suffers from significant shortcomings.

First, it focuses almost exclusively on Gaza while largely ignoring the realities in the West Bank and East Jerusalem. Any lasting solution must address the occupied Palestinian territory as a whole.

Second, the proposal does not meaningfully involve the State of Palestine.

Third, it makes no meaningful reference to the two-state solution, which has formed the basis of international diplomacy on this issue for decades.

In that sense, it departs from the historical framework within which the conflict has long been addressed.

And the countries pledged around US$1.5 billion each but have not actually paid.

The Board reported to the Security Council that conditions in Gaza had improved substantially. On the basis of the evidence before us, we cannot conclude that conditions have improved in any meaningful sense.

There is concern that international attention may shift away from Gaza following recent geopolitical developments, including the United States-Iran understanding. Does that worry you?

There was certainly such a concern. Major geopolitical developments often divert international attention.

That is precisely why we hoped this report would bring the focus back to Palestinian children.

Whatever happens elsewhere in the world, the suffering of children in Gaza continues every single day.

That is one reason why we have continued engaging with governments, regional organisations, civil society, and the media.

Keeping attention focused is itself an important part of protecting vulnerable populations.

If you had to leave governments with one message after this report, what would it be?

The international legal system has already established the principles. The evidence has now been gathered. The question is no longer whether the world knows. The question is whether governments are prepared to act consistently with the principles they themselves have accepted.

Ultimately, this is not simply about Palestine. It is about whether international law continues to have meaning.

If the rules that protect children during armed conflict are allowed to collapse here, they become weaker everywhere.

Preparing a report of this nature must have been emotionally demanding. What were the biggest challenges the Commission faced while investigating these violations?

The greatest challenge was not legal or technical. It was human. Behind every statistic was a child.

Our investigators were not simply analysing documents or verifying satellite images. They were repeatedly watching videos of children being killed, mutilated, stripped, tortured, and permanently disabled. Every case represented a life interrupted.

The Commission has an exceptionally dedicated team of investigators, forensic experts, and researchers based in Geneva. They worked through an enormous volume of evidentiary material. Every photograph, every video, every medical report, and every witness statement had to be authenticated and cross-verified before it could become part of our findings.

It is painstaking work. But it is also emotionally exhausting.

Given the political sensitivity of the Commission’s work, were members subjected to pressure or intimidation?

Our investigators know that even the smallest factual error will immediately be seized upon.

Therefore, every conclusion is checked repeatedly before publication.

One of my fellow commissioners, Chris Sidoti, has unfortunately been subjected to personal attacks and organised trolling. He has served on this commission since 2021 and has long experience in international human rights work.

Personally, however, neither Justice Florence Mumba nor I, since joining the commission, have experienced any direct pressure or intimidation.

Despite Israel’s refusal to participate officially, did you receive cooperation from within Israeli society?

Yes. That is an important point.

Although the Government of Israel chose not to cooperate with the commission, several Israeli civil society organisations have done so. Individuals within Israel have shared information, documentation, and publicly available material.

Throughout this interview, you have emphasised the importance of accountability. What, in your view, remains the biggest obstacle?

The greatest obstacle is impunity.

One of the striking features of the evidence we examined was the apparent confidence with which some soldiers recorded and uploaded videos of their own conduct.

Ordinarily, a person committing a criminal act attempts to conceal it.

Some Israeli political leaders have publicly made statements characterising Palestinian children in ways that effectively dehumanise them, and this rhetoric appears to have permeated down to soldiers on the ground.

Breaking that cycle is one of the principal responsibilities of the international legal system.

Those statements are important because they help explain the broader environment within which military operations are taking place.